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The Copyright Box Model 
Stephen T. Black* 
“A country without a patent office and good patent laws is just a 
crab and can’t travel any way but sideways and backwards.” 
—Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court 
INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property law is territorial in nature. That is why 
intellectual property assets have always been favorites among 
international tax planners. Rapid appreciation, even faster transfer times, 
and a somewhat vague standard for appraisal and valuation make for an 
interesting field of play. Transfer the assets to a low tax jurisdiction before 
the appreciation begins, and you find yourself with a large income stream 
that is taxed at a low rate. Miss the beat, and you have a large tax hit. 
For these reasons, many nations have followed the lead of Ireland in 
providing for so-called “patent box” schemes. These tax incentives 
provide lower tax rates for corporations who agree to develop intellectual 
property in the host country. With global IP royalties over $300 billion in 
2014,1 a tax savings of a few percentage points quickly adds up. 
But patents are not the only IP assets that can be developed and 
licensed. Recently, the Dutch government realized this and expanded their 
“patent box” regime and renamed it the “innovation box.” 
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9LDZ-CTFF]. However, some estimates have put the average growth rate for the intellectual property 
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While most of the world has focused on the interesting planning and 
development opportunities afforded patents and so-called “high-tech 
startups,” this Article will discuss the opportunities afforded by the lower-
hanging fruit of copyrights and copyright royalties. 
There are some 194 countries in the world today.2 Of those, 152 are 
Contracting States in the Patent Cooperation Treaty.3 However, that does 
not mean that patents are filed in all 152 countries, or even that all of those 
countries maintain patent offices. 
For 2015, high-income countries, of which there were fifty-six, 
accounted for 53.5% of the world patent applications.4 In contrast, the 
fifty-one low and lower-middle income countries accounted for only 
2.7%.5 The disparity between high-income and low-income countries in 
terms of their abilities to capture and exploit high technology IP is very 
stark. 
One way that these low-income countries can hope to participate in 
world wealth is by attracting outside businesses to their shores. This 
Article discusses the costs and infrastructure associated with developing a 
world-class ecosystem to attract outside business that is ready and willing 
to invest research and development (“R&D”) dollars in foreign 
jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the outlook is not good. It is expensive, in 
terms of both human and financial capital, to support a high-tech 
ecosystem capable of producing a high number of patent applications. 
Because most patents are not valuable,6 one might ask if there is a better 
                                                     
 2. How Many Countries Are In the World?, WORLD ATLAS, 
http://www.worldatlas.com/nations.htm [https://perma.cc/UYM8-C45U]; Matt Rosenberg, The 
Number of Countries in the World, THOUGHTCO (June 15, 2017), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/number-of-countries-in-the-world-1433445 [https://perma.cc/6XXQ-
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 3. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PCT APPLICANT’S GUIDE – INTERNATIONAL PHASE – 
ANNEX A 1–2 (June 9, 2017), http://www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/gdvol1/annexes/annexa/ax_a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3EAB-WQGB]. 
 4. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 2016 1, 
34 (2016), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FJ7-
2MSM]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1526 (2005) (“It 
is hard to imagine that just four years after paying $10,000-$30,000 for preparation and prosecution 
of a patent application, the successful patentee would decide to let the patent expire rather than pay 
the $900 maintenance fee. Nevertheless, this empirical study has found that 53.71% of all patentees 
do allow their patents to expire . . . .”). 
In truth, odds are stacked astronomically against inventors, and no marketing outfit can 
change them. ‘There are around 1.5 million patents in effect and in force in this country, 
and of those, maybe 3,000 are commercially viable,’ [Richard Maulsby, director of the 
Office of Public Affairs for the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office], says. ‘It’s a very small 
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way for lower income nations to attract outside businesses willing to 
develop IP. 
This Article suggests that copyrights are a lower-hanging fruit, and 
that by providing incentives for copyright development, developing 
nations will spend less and reap more benefit. Part I will discuss a short 
history of the patent box. Part II will ask why a copyright box might be 
preferable. Parts III and IV will discuss criticisms of box schemes, and 
then look at the OECD’s BEPS project in more detail. Part V will examine 
what issues will govern the design and implementation of a copyright box. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE BOX MODEL 
Imagine a developing country—let’s call it Newland. Newland has a 
middling economy and infrastructure. It wants to increase its tax base and 
compete with the better-developed countries of the world. One way for 
Newland to participate in world wealth is to attract outside business to its 
shores. 
Some countries have done so by implementing a patent box regime. 
Patent boxes group the income generated by patents and tax it at low rates.7 
By lowering the tax rate of intellectual property licensing income, the host 
country attracts large R&D companies and high-technology start-ups, 
generating wealth and promoting intellectual property development. 
Because of the tax incentives created by patent box regimes, many nations 
have followed the lead of Ireland, the original creator of the patent box.8 
Companies caught on quickly: they realized that if they transferred their 
assets to a low-tax jurisdiction before the appreciation began, they found 
themselves with a large income stream taxed at a very low rate. 
However, the patent box regime will not work for just any country. 
The problem is that patent boxes assume the infrastructure necessary for 
their creation. Countries that have not adopted a patent box are unlikely to 
be able to do so without a more sophisticated infrastructure. For example, 
some countries do not even have patent offices,9 and the disparity between 
high-income and low-income countries in terms of their abilities to capture 
and exploit high technology intellectual property is large. By 2014, the 
                                                     
percentage of patents that actually turn into products that make money for people. On top 
of all that, to get ripped off for tens of thousands of dollars adds insult to injury.’  
Karen E. Klein, Smart Answers, “Avoiding the Inventor’s Lament”, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 10, 2005. 
 7. Cherie L. Jones et al., Should the United States Enact a Patent Box?, THE TAX ADVISER (Nov. 
1, 2016), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2016/nov/should-us-enact-patent-box.html [https:// 
perma.cc/TBL4-B2JW]. 
 8. Tax Update: Irish 6.25% Knowledge Development Box, MASON HAYES & CURRAN (Oct. 27, 
2015), https://www.mhc.ie/latest/insights/irish-6.25-knowledge-development-box. 
 9. See Directory of Intellectual Property Offices, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/urls.jsp [https://perma.cc/Y43Z-FP24]. 
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disparity had grown even larger: the eighty high-income countries 
accounted for 58.4% of the world patent applications, while low and 
lower-middle income countries accounted for only 3.1%.10 
Newland finds itself in the latter category. It has no patent office and 
very little existing R&D infrastructure. One might ask if there is a better 
way for lower income nations to attract outside businesses looking to 
develop intellectual property. While most of the world has focused on 
patents and high-tech startups, patents are not the only intellectual property 
assets that can be licensed. Moreover, patents are not the only intellectual 
property assets that generate significant revenue. 
Technology is one key to economic growth. In his 1957 paper, A 
Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, economist Robert Solow 
showed that “a large majority of economic growth per hour of labor in the 
United States between 1909 and 1949 could be attributed to technological 
advances.”11 For his effort, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1987.12 
Since then, the world has accepted the importance technological 
development plays in economic growth.13 
If a developing nation wants to advance in terms of gross domestic 
product, per capita income, or standing in the world economic stage, it 
must have a stake in the world IP market. To progress towards achieving 
this goal, tax incentives are one way that developing nations have sought 
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in technology projects located 
within their borders.14 
 After Ireland’s introduction of the patent box scheme, France and 
Hungary were next to follow suit. Shortly after, other European 
jurisdictions—including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Cyprus, 





                                                     
 10. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO IP FACTS AND FIGURES 1, 9 (2015), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_943_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FKR-TV9P]. 
 11. Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, 
and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 348 n.2 (2013). 
 12. Press Release, The Royal Swed. Acad. of Sci., The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Econ. Sci. in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel 1987 (Oct. 21, 1987), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/1987/press.html [https://perma.cc/S2UF-LG8F]. 
 13. Graetz & Doud, supra note 11, at 348. 
 14. In addition to tax incentives, developing nations typically attempt to attract foreign direct 
investment through privatizing various business sectors, lowering trade barriers such as tariffs, 
investing in infrastructure, and reducing hassle costs. See Padma Mallampally & Karl P. Sauvant, 
Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 1999, at 34, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/mallampa.htm [https://perma.cc/8GLU-DFVV]. 
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15 See Gordon Gray, Key Elements of a Potential U.S. Patent Box, AM. ACTION F. (Aug. 26, 
2015), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/key-elements-of-a-potential-u-s-patent-box/ 
[https://perma.cc/PX3P-YJYQ]; see also #Luxleaks: The Reality of Tax ‘Competition’, UNCOUNTED 
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://uncounted.org/2014/12/17/luxleaks-reality-tax-competition/ [https:// 
perma.cc/VN7S-25QR]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX 
PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE 31 
(2014) [hereinafter COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES], http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-
Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/countering-harmful-tax-practices-more-effectively-taking-into-
account-transparency-and-substance-action-5-2015-final-report_9789264241190-
en#.Wa2X1siGPIU [https://perma.cc/85PP-4S2K]. Note that several of these jurisdictions have 
modified or enacted a plan of transition for their box schemes to comply with this report. 
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A. Other Countries 
Nations such as the United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia have 
strong legal and regulatory environments in comparison to that of other 
countries.16 These countries do not currently have a patent box regime, but 
have considered it. These countries’ corporate tax regimes could be 
amended; commentators have suggested that the lack of adoption of such 
a regime could result in a loss of business and the possibility of losing 
existing IP to countries that have more favorable tax regimes.17 
B. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
The OECD’s Action Plan on BEPS was published in July 2013 with 
a view to addressing perceived flaws in international tax rules. The 
40 page Action Plan, which was negotiated and drafted with the 
active participation of its member states, contained 15 separate action 
points or work streams, some of which were further split into specific 
actions or outputs. The Plan was squarely focused on addressing 
these issues in a coordinated, comprehensive manner, and was 
                                                     
 16. Jim Shanahan, Is It Time for Your Country to Consider the “Patent Box”?, PWC 1, 8 (May 
23, 2011), http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2011_is_it_time_for_your_country_to_consider_the_ 
patent_box.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HVE-WQAL]. 
 17. Id. 
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endorsed by G20 leaders and finance ministers at their summit in St. 
Petersburg in September 2013.18 
The “primary aim is to address situations where profits are perceived 
as geographically divorced from activities”19 and to “develop measures to 
counter the distorting effects of harmful tax competition on investment and 
financing decisions, and the consequences for national tax bases . . . .”20 
While the language used was less than clear, the message was clear, and 
rather than take their chances with parsing words, many countries have 
decided to revise or abandon their plans for patent box schemes. 
The . . . OECD . . . has called for a “nexus” approach to benefits 
granted under such regimes as part of its package of final reports 
under the OECD’s Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. 
Many countries are already amending or have amended their existing 
patent box structures to align with the OECD’s nexus approach, 
under which a company would have to locate its R&D and associated 
jobs in the country offering the preferential tax rate in order to receive 
the benefit.21 
However, it is possible to design a box scheme that does not run afoul 
of BEPS concerns. If we return to the basic question—whether it is 
possible to encourage economic activity in a jurisdiction—we are not 
automatically led to ignore the possibilities of a box scheme. 
II.  WHY A COPYRIGHT BOX? 
Any jurisdiction interested in economic growth through increased IP 
development would do well to consider a few reasons why a copyright box 
may be preferable to other types of boxes: (A) the copyright industry’s 
contribution to GDP frequently rivals that of the patent industry (i.e. 
copyrights produce as much revenue as patents); (B) a copyright 
ecosystem may be easier to foster; (C) the legal system for a copyright box 
is much easier to create and manage; and (D) the costs of a copyright 
system are much less. Each of these points will be covered in turn. 
                                                     
 18. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan, PWC, 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/tax/tax-policy-administration/beps.html 
[https://perma.cc/3WXH-K6NT]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Recommendation of the Council on Counteracting Harmful Tax Competition, ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Apr. 9, 1998), 
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=92&InstrumentPID=89&
Lang=en [https://perma.cc/PSC4-627Q]. 
 21. Thinking Inside the Box: Why It’s Time to Pay Attention to Innovation/Patent Box Regimes, 
EY 4 (2016) [hereinafter EY, Thinking Inside the Box], 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-thinking-inside-the-box/$FILE/EY-thinking-
inside-the-box.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PQ2-KWD6]. 
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A. Copyright Contributions to GDP 
Let’s return to Newland, a developing country that has decided it 
wants to participate in some of the copyright industry’s22 growth.23 A look 
at the copyright growth in the United States will help paint a clear picture 
of the growth potentially available to Newland. 
According to the International Intellectual Property Alliance the U.S. 
copyright industry has grown almost three times as fast as the 
economy as a whole for the past 20 years. In 1997, the total copyright 
industries contributed an estimated US$ 529.3 billion to the U.S. 
economy with the core copyright industries accounting for US$ 348.4 
billion. Between 1977 and 1997, the absolute growth rate of value 
added to the U.S. GDP by the core copyright industries was 241%. 
Also the copyright industry’s foreign sales in 1997 (US$ 66.85 billion 
for the core copyright industries) were larger than the U.S. Commerce 
Department International Trade Administration’s estimates of the 
exports of almost all other leading industry sectors. They exceeded 
even the combined automobile and automobile parts industries, as 
well as the agricultural sector.24 
The copyright sector—those industries that produce and use 
copyrights—is large, and the number of jobs and the value that they add 
to the economies of the world is surprising. 25 
                                                     
 22. Those industries that create copyrighted works as their primary product include the motion 
picture industry (television, theatrical, and home video), the recording industry (records, tapes and 
CDs), the music publishing industry, the book, journal, and newspaper publishing industry, the 
software industry (including data processing, business applications and interactive entertainment 
software on all platforms), the legitimate theater industry, the advertising industry, and the radio, 
television, and cable broadcasting industries. 
 23. The International Intellectual Property Alliance determined that “value added to U.S. GDP 
by the ‘total’ copyright industries in 2010 was $1.627 trillion, or 11.10% of U.S. GDP.” STEPHEN E. 
SIWEK, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALL., COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2011 
REPORT 4 (Nov. 2011), http://www.iipawebsite.com/pdf/2011CopyrightIndustriesReport.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/J2A2-VHXJ]. This agrees with WIPO’s assessment. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
ORG., WIPO STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 2–3 (2014) 
[hereinafter WIPO STUDIES]. 
 24. The Copyright Industry, WORLD-INFORMATION.ORG, http://world-
information.org/wio/infostructure/100437611725/100438658710/?ic=100446326381 
[https://perma.cc/CJH2-7GGY]. 
 25. See generally STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALL., COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2016 REPORT (Dec. 2016), 
http://www.iipawebsite.com/pdf/2016CpyrtRptFull.PDF [https://perma.cc/S8S7-JW8S]. “The ‘core’ 
copyright industries are those industries whose primary purpose is to create, produce, distribute or 
exhibit copyright materials.” Id. at 1 n.1. These industries include computer software, videogames, 
books, newspapers, periodicals and journals, motion pictures, recorded music, and radio and television 
broadcasting. Id. at iii. Partial copyright industries “are industries in which only some aspect or portion 
of the products that they create can qualify for copyright protection. These industries range from fabric 
to jewelry to furniture to toys and games.” Id. at 2 n.3. Non-dedicated support industries include those 
“that distribute both copyright and non-copyright protected materials to businesses and consumers. 
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Evidence strongly suggests that workforce location is influenced by 
innovation boxes.26 In addition, according to the OECD,27 research jobs in 
member countries went from 2.8 million in 1995 to 4.2 million in 2007.28 
Among the economies with greater than 200,000 researchers, they make 
up the highest proportion of the workforce in Japan, South Korea, and the 
United States29 The incentive for moving research overseas is proven by 
further data from the Council on Foreign Relations.30 In recent years, U.S. 
multinationals almost doubled their overseas R&D jobs, going from 
137,800 in 2004 to 267,400 in 2009.31 However, they only created 22,300 
new jobs domestically.32 The job creation by the patent box is undeniable, 
but we should consider the potential job numbers from the copyright 
industries. 
Last year, for the first time ever, the copyright industries contributed 
over $1 trillion to the U.S. economy.33 According to the International 
Intellectual Property Alliance, in 2015, copyright industries accounted for 
nearly 6.9% of GDP, which was nearly 4.6% of all private sector jobs (5.5 
million) in the United States.34 In addition, from 2012 to 2015, copyright 
                                                     
Examples here include transportation services, telecommunications and wholesale and retail trade. As 
in past studies, only a portion of the total value added by these industries is considered to be part of 
the copyright industries.” Id. 
 Interdependent industries “include those that produce, manufacture, and sell equipment whose 
function is primarily to facilitate the creation, production, or use of works of copyrighted matter. These 
industries include manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of TV sets, personal computers[,]” and 
usage dependent products, including blank recording material and certain categories of paper. Id. We 
refer to the four groups together—core, partial, non-dedicated support, and interdependent—as the 
“‘total’ copyright industries.” Id. 
 26. See W. Wesley Hill & J. Sims Rhyne III, Opening Pandora’s Patent Box: Global Intellectual 
Property Tax Incentives and Their Implications for the United States, 53 IDEA 371, 387 (2013); 
ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT ANDES, INFO. TECH. AND INNOVATION FOUND., PATENT BOXES: 
INNOVATION IN TAX POLICY AND TAX POLICY FOR INNOVATION 1 (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.itif.org/files/2011-patent-box-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4W6-UJPW]. 
 27. Current member countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ [https://perma.cc/8ECB-ZWWF]. 
 28. Global S&E Labor Force, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/c3/c3s5.htm#s3 [https://perma.cc/Z3H6-46CW]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Steven J. Markovich, Promoting Innovation Through R&D, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/innovation/promoting-innovation-through-rd/p29403 [https:// 
perma.cc/XSR9-65F8]. 
31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. David Newhoff, Spin This: Copyright Industries Grow at Twice the Rate of US Economy, 
ILLUSION OF MORE (Nov. 19, 2013), http://illusionofmore.com/copyright-industries-economy/ 
[https://perma.cc/8N74-HKS7]. 
 34. SIWEK, supra note 25, at 2. 
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industries grew at an aggregate annual rate of 4.81%, which is more than 
twice the rate of the U.S. economy overall (2.1%).35 
Looking at the growth of the U.S. economy through its copyright 
industries shows the potential growth for a developing country, such as 
Newland. Newland could capitalize on some of this growth and increase 
tax revenue by attracting FDI into their country through the tax incentives 
a copyright box would provide. Those jurisdictions who think that they 
might be settling for the “soft” IP instead of pursuing the “hard” IP of 
patents would be well advised to examine just how large a contribution to 
GDP the copyright industries make. 
The following chart, created by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, shows the overall contribution to GDP and employment in 
a number of countries36: 
 
While IP-intensive industries accounted for 18.8[%] of all jobs in 
the economy in 2010, their $5.06 trillion in value added in 2010 
represented 34.8[%] of total GDP. This total share of GDP has 
edged down since 2003. . . . Patent-intensive and copyright-
intensive industries accounted for 5.3 and 4.4[%] of GDP, with 
$763 billion and $641 billion in value added, respectively.37 
                                                     
 35. Id. at 2, 7. 
 36. WIPO STUDIES, supra note 23, at 2. 
 37. ECON. AND STAT. ADMIN. & U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS 45 (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/79B8-
XY9Q]. 
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B. Copyright Box is Easier 
A copyright box is easier to implement than a patent box. Consider 
the fact that a patent box requires a patent regime. This means that 
Newland would have to have, at the very least, a Patent Office and a staff 
of examiners,38 a legal system that can handle infringement disputes,39 and 
enough of an R&D ecosystem (including universities) to make the 
jurisdiction attractive to outside interests.40 In addition, because no 
investor is going to invest significant research dollars without legal 
protections, Newland will also need a fairly significant business structure 
regime. To the extent that these new regimes require court participation, 
there will be a significant time and training expense required to prepare 
Newland’s courts for the influx of novel cases it will inevitably see (not to 
mention a waiting period while the first cases make their way through the 
system).41 It will be tough to get early adopters to Newland. 
Perhaps most importantly, the ecosystem necessary to support a 
copyright box is much different than that for a patent regime. The types of 
industries that create copyrights—authors and publishers, software 
developers, designers, film and television producers, and artists, 
musicians, and the recording industry—do not require near the 
infrastructure that scientists do.42 
The ecosystem also attracts a different type of consumer: 
                                                     
 38. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 2 (2010). 
 39. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s ‘Renegade Jurisdiction’: Lessons for Patent Law 
Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 142 (2008). 
 40. See, e.g., Christian A. Angotti, The Industry Too Big to Fall . . . Stumbling: Evaluating 
Academia’s Use of Patent Rights and Its Consequential Effects on Public-Private Partnership 
Negotiations with Pharmaceutical Companies, 18 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 219 (2016). 




In assessing Europe’s new patent regime, the core change is not just the addition of a new 
type of IP right. It is just as much about disempowering the national court systems and 
entrusting patent litigation into a new (and untested) court system, with its structure and 
rules of procedure built from scratch. This carries risks, as well as opportunities. 
Id. 
 42. See Robert Spoo, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Scholarly Research and Copyright Case 
Law Since 1992, 34 TULSA L.J. 183, 198 (1998) (“The progress of science and useful arts depends 
vitally on the robust participation of the members of this ecosystem as well as on their ability to 
exercise self-restraint. Righteous self-assertion and negative capability must work together to achieve 
a delicate balance.”); Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles Project: 
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1181 (2010) (“A successful copyright 
‘ecosystem’ should nurture a diverse range of works. It should encourage creators to make and 
disseminate new works of authorship and support readers, listeners, viewers, and other users in 
experiencing those works.”). 
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Certainly, users are rational consumers in many of their interactions 
with creative expression. But at other times, users are deeply 
passionate about creative work, and, given an opportunity to connect 
with the creative process and a reason to do so, they will willingly 
invest in creative production. Users—or, more accurately, fans—
fundamentally want to support artists.43 
Attracting copyright creators is also a different process. Richard 
Florida posits that the “creative class” flocks not to corporate communities 
or traditional working centers, but instead to “creative centers.” “What 
they look for in communities are abundant high-quality experiences, an 
openness to diversity of all kinds, and, above all else, the opportunity to 
validate their identities as creative people.”44 
C. Copyright Regime 
Copyright protection has influenced the intellectual, cultural, and 
economic history of European and world society.45 At copyright’s earliest 
point, English book printers and sellers created guilds that used private 
agreements not to publish other members’ work.46 In 1557, a royal charter 
was granted that reserved to members of the Stationers Company the 
exclusive right to print works.47 The Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710 by 
British Parliament, is known as the world’s first official copyright 
statute.48 
However, since the early 1960s, international treaty negotiations 
have underlined the differing opinions between developed and developing 
countries on the copyright industry.49 Developing nations believe 
intellectual property rights are excessively restricting the nation’s access 
to technology.50 These growing nations do not want to be denied access to 
technology or pay burdensome royalty and licensing fees.51 Developed 
nations answer these arguments with the fact that intellectual property 
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rights “protect their substantial investments in research and development 
and offer a fair return for their efforts.”52 An example of this debate was 
demonstrated when Taiwan passed legislation creating a new copyright 
regime after being placed on the Priority Watch List by the United States 
and receiving pressure from various intellectual property groups.53 
For a nation that has never entered the world copyright stage, 
implementing a copyright regime may be relatively easy. Model copyright 
statutes are available.54 While a copyright office is necessary, the 
workload, at least initially, is smaller.55 
D. Budget 
The U.S. Copyright Office receives approximately $52 million from 
Congress and uses a staff of about 460 full-time equivalents.56 The U.S. 
Copyright Office recorded 670,044 works in fiscal year 2011.57 By 
comparison, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) had 10,210 
employees for the same time period.58 The PTO handled 536,604 patent 
filings and 398,667 trademark filings.59 The PTO today is run 100% from 
program fees, but for many years it operated in the red (today’s surplus is 
due to an increase in user fees).60 For fiscal year 2011, the PTO’s total 
program cost was $2,148,097,000.61 This means the PTO costs forty times 
more than the Copyright Office to operate, and significantly, the PTO’s 
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most significant program cost is personnel services and benefits, which 
comprise approximately 70% of PTO’s total program costs.62 
In short, when we consider that: (1) copyrights produce the same 
amounts of revenue as patents and trademarks; (2) a copyright ecosystem 
and legal regime are simpler; and (3) a patent office can be up to forty 
times more expensive, the justification for a copyright box is much easier. 
III.  CRITICISMS OF BOXES 
For all the benefits of boxes, they are not without drawbacks. One 
concern is that the creation of new box schemes may reduce the value of 
the already established box regimes in other countries. Another concern is 
the loss of tax revenue relative to any forecast increase in investment or 
business activity. More practically, the cost of implementing a new regime 
is also prohibitive for both developed countries and underdeveloped 
countries. 
A. Value Decreases When the Number of Boxes Increase 
Box regimes significantly affect decisions concerning the location of 
new IP, but there can be a race to the bottom: 
[W]hen the United Kingdom introduces a patent box regime, the 
Benelux patent share will decrease (though it will still be greater 
than the initial share). Therefore, the benefits to a nation of 
introducing a patent box are diminished as more countries adopt 
patent boxes. . . . [I]ntroduction of patent box regimes will 
decrease patent revenue for all affected countries.63 
Graetz and Doud’s research tends to support both the conclusion that 
a copyright box would attract IP producers to a jurisdiction, and the 
conclusion that the spoils go to the jurisdictions that act first. However, as 
more jurisdictions adopt these types of schemes, the system becomes zero-
sum (or worse, it may become a race to the bottom if investors come to 
expect lower taxes). 
B. Loss of Revenue 
The loss of revenue criticism of creating a box regime argues that the 
developing nation will lose more in tax revenues than it gains in increased 
direct investment and the related “spillover”—increased national 
awareness, related infrastructure development, increased jobs for the local 
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population, etc. Because the spillover effects are difficult to measure, this 
argument is hard to prove or disprove. 
The . . . argument, that tax incentives are ineffective and harmful 
because their cost in forgone revenue exceeds their benefits, is also 
problematic. If tax incentives are as ineffective as alleged, then no 
harm is done. Investors are not attracted, behavior is not distorted, 
and tax revenue is not forgone. Tax incentives cannot be harmful and 
ineffective at the same time unless taxpayers can take advantage of 
the tax incentives without actually investing, or unless investors who 
would have made the investment even without the tax incentives 
benefit from them.64 
There are examples for both sides, which may suggest that the 
criticism is misdirected. Obviously with a number of examples of 
successful tax subsidy schemes, the underlying premise is sound: you can 
offer a tax subsidy in exchange for direct investment and have it work to 
the benefit of the developing country. However, the examples of failed 
regimes also pose the warning corollary: you must design the scheme 
carefully. It is possible to pay too much for the foreign investment, 
resulting in harm to the jurisdiction. 
C. Costs Associated with Creating a Box 
1. Infrastructure and Ecosystem 
Patent boxes assume the very infrastructure necessary for their 
creation. If a low-income country does not have a patent box because it is 
poor, it probably has poor infrastructure and is not ready to attract high-
tech businesses. 
Copyright boxes need infrastructure too, but specifically one that 
encourages the production, distribution, and consumption of creative 
works. “If the copyright system works like an ecosystem, the goal of 
copyright law should be to encourage sustainable development of creative 
resources in a way that provides incentives to creators, yet preserves the 
resources essential for new creations.”65 
2. Problems with Proposed Boxes in the United States 
In 2001, then-House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave 
Camp proposed a limited patent box for the United States.66 The box 
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would have been part of a larger corporate income tax reform, which 
would have reduced the corporate tax rate from 35% to 25% and provided 
a 95% exemption for overseas profits when repatriated to the United 
States.67 Specifically, the patent box was one of the alternatives the former 
Chairman offered as an answer to the eroding tax base.68 The change 
would have created a tax rate of 15% on this intangible income.69 
Because it was part of a larger and quite costly tax reform package, 
Camp’s proposal eventually died.70 However, others like it have been 
proposed since 2011. In the summer of 2015, House Ways and Means 
Committee Members Charles Boustany and Richard Neal proposed draft 
legislation deemed the Innovation Promotion Act of 2015.71 The draft was 
meant to encourage discussion and outlined a basic framework for the 
creation of an innovation box in the United States.72 One problem was that 
there was likely to be a substantial revenue loss.73 The United States is not 
a developing nation, but does share a concern about the amount of foreign 
investment directed to the United States compared with its trading 
partners.74 
D. Other Criticisms 
1. Addressing Other Needs 
Historically, developed nations needed approximately 150 years to 
establish a patent regime.75 Rushing to create an IP regime without 
recognizing basic human needs may not be the wisest course of action: 
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‘The core issue in developing countries is . . . the need for 
infrastructure, the provision of basic human needs, the guarantee of 
basic human rights, and the upward mobility [of people].’ The 
economies of developing countries face crises similar to what 
developed nations faced during the depression, including diseases, 
overpopulation, lack of infrastructure, and inadequate 
industrialization. ‘In light of such priorities, intellectual property 
rights, divorced from [the] immediate needs of a country’ are a mere 
luxury.76 
2. Short-Term Fixes 
In addition, IP box schemes do not exist in a vacuum. Part of the 
attractiveness depends on the interplay of other nations, including other 
nations which may react to the creation of new legal schemes over time. 
Some have warned that the benefits of changing regimes may only be seen 
long-term and that other harms—including welfare losses,77 a 
redistribution of wealth to more developed nations,78 or increased 
competition with more powerful nations—may result.79 
3. Tax Incentives Distort Behavior 
“Conventional wisdom weighs against using tax incentives to attract 
investment in general and foreign direct investment in particular. 
International organizations including the United Nations, World Bank, 
IMF, OECD and the EU have unanimously opposed the use of tax 
incentives to attract investments.”80 
In any discussion of tax incentives—whether at the local, national or 
global level—there is never a consensus that tax incentives are 
appropriate. Critics of tax incentives, at least as a means to encourage 
foreign investment, generally raise one of three issues: (1) tax incentives 
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distort behavior; (2) they are ineffective and harmful; and (3) tax 
incentives are indirect solutions, and direct solutions are better.81 
a. Tax Incentives Distort Behavior 
This argument is usually followed up by one of two conclusions, both 
of which are seen as bad. First, distorting behavior is inefficient, as a 
matter of economic analysis. 
Second, distorting behavior does not solve the underlying problem, 
which is that the jurisdiction is seeking to increase its desirability as a place 
to invest and the incentives only serve as a false or temporary “fix.” 
If developing countries could create good infrastructure, a highly 
skilled labor force, zero inflation, a progressive tax and transfer 
system, political stability, and a functioning judicial system, they 
would not be developing countries; they would be the United 
States. . . . Tax incentives are not used to attract FDI instead of 
adopting sound policies and building good institutions, but in 
addition to such efforts.82 
b. Tax Incentives Are Ineffective or Harmful 
This type of argument focuses on the fact that a tax incentive, to the 
extent the government agrees to forgo the collection of revenue, is roughly 
equal (at least in some form) to a direct expenditure. If so, then would such 
a direct expenditure survive a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis?83 
It also involves the claim that tax incentives may harm the nature of 
the tax system or the nature of the market that the tax incentive seeks to 
influence (i.e. the market of foreign capital). “In theory, tax incentives 
could be used to correct market failures or compensate for positive 
externalities; however, it is impossible to trust governments and especially 
those of developing countries to use tax incentives in such a way that will 
exclusively achieve those goals.”84 
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c. Direct Measures Are Better 
“[E]mpirical findings from a panel of 19 OECD countries indicated 
that direct support seems to have a larger impact than R&D tax 
incentives . . . .”85 
This, of course, is balanced by the relative ease that tax measures 
have in terms of having the bureaucratic infrastructure in place and a 
certain measure of non-transparency.86 
4. Responses 
Tax incentives are designed to distort behavior. If the behavior were 
working in the way the designers of the tax system wanted, there would 
be no reason to try to influence it. However, if the desired behavior (i.e. 
increased revenues from copyright license fees) cannot be sustained 
without the tax system “priming,” then the criticism about harm and 
effectiveness takes on new importance. 
In many cases, however, governments are trying to overcome natural 
or external deficiencies in the market. There is a balance that needs to be 
drawn when implementing new tax incentives. On the one hand, such 
measures (hopefully!) are temporary as a way to jump-start industry and 
investment. On the other hand, temporary measures are inefficient because 
investors tend to feel skittish about measures that may disappear. As a 
result, it is fair to question the efficacy and wisdom of adopting 
“permanent” temporary tax incentives to jump start the production of IP. 
China’s Effectiveness in Attracting FDI 
There is a world of data examining the factors that may affect an 
investor’s decisions regarding the chosen location of investment.87 
Surveys of investors have shown that “‘tax exemption is like a dessert; it 
is good to have, but it does not help very much if the meal is not there.’”88 
That data shows that tax incentives are important to have, but they are not 
a deciding factor to an investor.89 On the other hand, surveys of 
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government officials have ranked tax incentives as a key factor in 
attracting FDI.90 
China is the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries and 
has received exponential growth over the past thirty years.91 Over this 
time, China has offered generous tax incentives to FDI, which can lead to 
the conclusion that China’s tax incentives were a significant factor in 
attracting FDI.92 Most Chinese scholars and international scholars 
generally share in this assessment and attribute China’s growth in FDI to 
its generous tax incentives.93 Further, an apparent correlation exists 
between FDI and the Chinese location-specific and activity-specific tax 
incentives offered: over 70% of FDI has been in manufacturing,94 and over 
80% of FDI in China was invested in the coastal areas.95 “However, using 
the FDI growth as a basis for asserting the effectiveness of tax incentives 
is unreliable as it fails to identify the amount of FDI inflow that would not 
have occurred in the absence of the tax incentives.”96 
The European Union has conducted a survey on the factors 
influencing investors’ decisions to invest in China.97 Ninety-one percent 
of investors put incentive packages on a medium or higher position and 
41% considered them highly important.98 However, this study does not 
explicitly speak to whether it was tax incentives that played a critical role 
in choosing China. Ultimately, the data and studies suggest that tax 
incentives play a part in an investor’s locale decisions, at least in China, 
but the criticism does not offer a clear picture as to how important they 
really are. 
IV.  BACK TO BEPS 
The OECD began working on addressing the issue of harmful tax 
competition in the late 1990s and released a report in 1998.99 The OECD 
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nations were worried about “base erosion” and “tax flight”—that 
companies headquartered in their jurisdictions would use IP boxes to 
escape tax in their home countries. The OECD reports were noticeably 
vague, but centered on two types of threats: “Tax havens” and “harmful 
tax competition.” Trying to define what constituted a tax haven or harmful 
tax competition when the OECD nations themselves engaged in tax 
competition proved difficult.100 After all, not everyone thinks that “tax 
havens” are “wrong.” 
This campaign against low-tax jurisdictions is fundamentally 
misguided. Tax havens (to use the pejorative term coined by 
proponents of big government) have a valuable role in the global 
economy. They provide a low-tax platform for economic activity. 
They facilitate the efficient allocation of capital. They encourage the 
accumulation of capital. And, because of tax competition, they 
encourage better tax law in the rest of the world.101 
A. Where is the “Harm”? 
On April 18, 2002, the OECD issued its most recent list—the List of 
Uncooperative Tax Havens. In a statement issued on the day the list 
was issued, OECD Deputy Secretary-General, Seiichi Kondo, 
expressed his sorrow that the seven jurisdictions on the list had 
‘decided that it is not in their interest to join OECD countries and 
other members of the international community in ending harmful tax 
practices that facilitate tax cheating and distort the market for 
financial services.’ . . . By providing a framework within which all 
countries—developed and developing—can work together to fight 
harmful tax practices, the OECD seeks to encourage transparent and 
fair tax competition.102 
However, not everyone bought the story that the OECD had global 
welfare in mind with this project: 
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Given this significant fiscal dependence, any loss of competitiveness 
in the financial services sector resulting from the OECD’s actions 
would have catastrophic results. It is reported that these developing 
nations could realize as much as a 25% decrease in GDP should they 
alter their current tax practices to adhere to OECD guidelines. Such 
striking losses would lead to an economic collapse devastating 
enough to return these offshore tax havens to their total dependence 
on highly unstable industries. Consequently, all recent attempts to 
achieve the economic development, stability, and independence 
sufficient to control poverty and other social ailments experienced by 
these nations would be throttled.103 
[T]he Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD) effort to stamp out tax competition . . . . is designed in effect 
to create a tax cartel and, if the OECD succeeds, [these nations] will 
face the risk of higher taxes and a weakened economy while 
developing nations will be hamstrung in their attempts to promote 
economic growth . . . . Tax competition is a strong factor in both 
maintaining and increasing the vibrancy of economies across the 
globe . . . . The OECD is even trying to impose its will on nations that 
are not members of the organization, calling for draconian sanctions 
against so-called tax havens. This is troubling on several levels. 
Sovereign nations should be free to determine their own tax policies 
. . . and it hardly seems right for us to participate in a campaign to 
force other nations to change their tax laws.104 
B. Nexus Approach 
“The nexus approach focuses on establishing a nexus between 
expenditures, these IP assets, and income. Under the nexus approach, 
marketing-related IP assets such as trademarks can never qualify for tax 
benefits under an IP regime.”105 
Why? 
The criticisms against the OECD approach are many.106 At its core, 
the OECD seems afraid that R&D centers, once housed in the OECD 
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nations, could move (or have their income centers move) to non-OECD 
nations. Thus, the term BEPS was born. 
The problem with the OECD’s report on Action 5 is one of 
perspective. Do box schemes hurt OECD members? Probably. Is the 
OECD justified in taking action to protect its members? Also, probably 
yes. Does that mean that the OECD policy is right? No. 
Even were we to assume that the OECD statement is correct—that 
harmful tax competition arises when the locus of income and expenditure 
are different—we are not correct in assuming (which the OECD has 
blindly done) that patents are the only IP which will qualify for acceptable 
IP schemes. In fact, the OECD report paints a stark picture between patent 
and patent-type assets and so-called “marketing-related” trademarks, but 
they completely ignore copyrights, except for software copyrights.107 
So, we are left to answer the question for ourselves: Do copyright 
boxes constitute harmful tax competition? 
C. Copyright Boxes and the OECD 
1. Territoriality 
Despite the stated goal of the OECD reports to establish “a nexus 
between expenditures, these IP assets, and income,” the OECD, in a most 
non-transparent way, excludes all assets that are not patents or 
“functionally equivalent” to patents. We can see why the OECD would 
want to ban trademarks because their value very easily applies to 
multinational entities as a whole, as opposed to having a value that “lives” 
in one jurisdiction alone. 
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Recall that the OECD concern was of shifting profits away from the 
jurisdiction that created them. Moving a trademark or creating a new 
trademark does not mitigate against the fact that trademarks apply 
universally (especially in a connected, digital world). If Apple were to 
create a new trademarked logo in a developing world, users across the 
globe would notice and, presumably, the value would increase the value 
of all subsidiaries. 
Copyrights, like patents, are much more territorial and can frequently 
be tied to tangible media (or at least media that behaves in territorial ways). 
Copyrights can be controlled. 
2. “Rightly Belongs” 
[The OECD] acknowledged, for example, that, ‘at certain stages’ of 
development, tax incentives might be ‘justifiable from the point of 
view of the country in question’—but this is hardly an enthusiastic 
endorsement. Moreover, the OECD seems to regard any shifting of 
investment as suspect. It alludes to countries ‘bidding aggressively’ 
for other countries’ tax bases and of countries ‘poaching’ a tax base 
that ‘rightly belongs’ to another country and concludes that ‘such 
practices would be doubtlessly labeled “harmful tax competition”.’ 
But none of these terms— ‘bidding aggressively,’ ‘poaching,’ 
‘rightly belongs’—is defined.108 
Patents may be the easiest type of IP to trace its development. 
Scientists and researchers frequently keep logs and journals, so 
expenditures for equipment and costs can be apportioned.109 Trademarks, 
as have been discussed, are not as easy to divide, even if the activity to 
create them occurs in only one jurisdiction. Copyrights can produce 
similar questions, as will be shown in the next section. 
3. Substantiality 
In addition, the absence of a requirement that the activity be 
substantial is important because it suggests that a jurisdiction may be 
attempting to attract investment and transactions that are purely tax 
driven. It may also indicate that a jurisdiction does not (or cannot) 
provide a legal or commercial environment or offer any economic 
advantages that would attract substantive business activities in the 
absence of the tax minimising opportunities it provides. The 
determination of when and whether an activity is substantial can be 
difficult. For example, financial and management services may in 
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certain circumstances involve substantial activities. However, certain 
services provided by ‘paper companies’ may be readily found to lack 
substance.110 
The substantial activity factor assumes that if activities (and related 
expenditures) occur within a jurisdiction, then the resulting IP must 
“rightly belong” there as well. This assumption does not always hold true 
for patents (researchers can bring knowledge with them to a new 
jurisdiction), but infringement, breach of non-compete agreements, and 
trade secret protection is usually felt to police serious violations. 
How should copyrights fare under this scrutiny? There are two 
considerations. While copyrights have a lower standard of innovation, 
“patent law’s standards of novelty, non[-]obviousness, and utility set a 
high bar for protectability. That elevated standard accords with society’s 
frequent willingness to adopt groundbreaking inventions. By contrast, 
copyright’s standard of originality sets the bar much lower, making it easy 
for artistic works to gain protection.”111 
With a lower standard for protectability, it could be argued that some 
value created in a high-tax jurisdiction could be transferred to a low-tax 
jurisdiction, even with economic activity occurring in the low-tax 
jurisdiction. However, copyright requires “fixing” the creative endeavor 
in a tangible medium (writing, recording, filming, etc.).112 If the “fixing” 
activities occur in the low-tax jurisdiction, the risks of tax flight are the 
same as for patents. 
The second consideration is that copyrights are much more “mobile.” 
Consider the following: 
 
Example 1. J, a Korean pop star, decides to travel to country X, 
which offers a copyright box with lower income rates than Korea for 
qualifying copyright royalties. J composes 12 songs and licenses those 
songs to a corporation formed in X. 
 
Example 2. N, a well-known creator of a popular American drama, 
also decides to travel to X to produce the third season of the drama. 
 
Example 3. P, a German software developer, also relocates to X 
while in the middle of creating what turns out to be a very popular app. 
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In each of these examples, it can be argued that some of the value of 
the resulting copyrights started in another country and, therefore, the move 
to X resulted in base erosion. However, it can also be argued that 
“substantial domestic activities” have occurred, which are “legally 
protected.”113 Is this harmful tax competition? How can that argument 
stand, given that copyright industries rely much less on R&D 
infrastructure and much more on “artistic works?”114 
V.  DESIGNING A BOX 
Assuming that a nation decides that a box is the right strategy and 
that a copyright box is the correct vehicle, there remain several issues in 
the design of the box that bear mention. Who are the targeted taxpayers? 
What kind(s) of IP qualify? Which items of income and expense are 
affected by the regime and what will be the tax benefit? Where must the 
IP and related activities be located? How will all of this affect a 
jurisdiction’s other incentives for innovation? 
A. Qualifying Taxpayers 
A new copyright box regime would need to address whether 
domestic as well as foreign entities (and/or individuals) would be eligible 
to participate. There is more control if only domestic entities can 
participate, as foreign companies would then need a domestic subsidiary 
(which allows the jurisdiction more control). Some countries limit 
participation by foreign taxpayers to those with a permanent establishment 
in the country and who come from a jurisdiction with a tax treaty with the 
home country.115 
Additionally, there should be thought given as to whether the benefits 
are available to corporations only to the exclusion of individuals (or small 
businesses) and pass-through entities,116 as this can influence not only the 
focus and the marketing of the regime, but also its cost. Pass-through 
entities can allow the tax benefits to flow in ways that might violate the 
OECD recommendations or to flow outside the jurisdiction. 
Finally, some thought should be given to limiting the ability of the 
entity receiving tax benefits to leave the jurisdiction, possibly by the use 
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of agreements with a claw-back provision (i.e. if an entity attempts to: (1) 
move to another jurisdiction; (2) a significant percentage of its activities 
are no longer conducted in the jurisdiction; or (3) a significant percentage 
of shares are held by residents of other countries, then the tax benefits 
accrued must be repaid). 
B. Qualifying IP 
Basic questions in the design of a copyright box scheme include what 
types of copyrights to include. Software is different from film, which is 
different from music. Do all types of copyrights qualify? 
There is also the question of whether all or a majority of the activities 
to create, produce, or distribute the media have to occur in the jurisdiction, 
and what do we mean by production activities or creation activities? 
Sometimes inspiration strikes and a hit song is written in an evening. Has 
the creative activity occurred in the jurisdiction even if the song is about a 
painful relationship that just ended elsewhere?117 Does the writer have to 
establish residency first? Should work performed outside the jurisdiction 
where the box is located qualify (because many creative endeavors require 
a team)? 
Finally, copyrights have a long shelf life. Are acquired copyrights 
included in the box? Consider the following scenarios from Newland: 
- A Newland corporation buys or licenses the Newland copyright 
from an American author. 
- A Newland corporation acquires a record label from Germany and 
then proceeds to register the copyrights in Newland. 
- A Newland corporation hires an indie director to produce a 
Newland version of a popular movie the director made in Spain. 
All are arguably “new” and original in Newland and would increase 
the ecosystem of creativity. Do they meet the standard of substantiality? 
Would they be considered “poaching” of the creative work of the citizens 
of another jurisdiction? Does the scheme encourage forum shopping or 
certain sham transactions, where existing copyright assets are simply 
placed in a subsidiary within the copyright box jurisdiction to take 
advantage of the tax savings? Does the income from foreign copyrights 
qualify? 
Further, translation rights are an important feature to consider 
including in the box.118 New translation rights have been a significant 
benefit to American authors translating to Taiwanese.119 The same benefit 
could be implemented for authors needing an English translation. Another 
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consideration is choosing the remedies for infringement available for 
copyright holders.120 Lastly, what terms of protection will be offered for 
copyright holders?121 This important feature offers an incentive for the life 
of the copyright. 
C. Qualifying Income and Expenditures 
1. Expenses 
Expenses related to creative endeavors have always proved difficult 
for tax systems because the dividing line between allowable expenses and 
personal, non-tax expenses is never clear. Also, allocating expenses 
between multiple, on-going projects can be difficult. 
Further, for individuals and entities engaged in multiple projects, 
there can be expenses that do not directly relate to any particular property 
(e.g. interest, rent, utilities, insurance, and salaries). These need to be 
factored in, especially if the expenses occur in a separate year from the 
development of the IP. 
2. Income 
Different jurisdictions define income differently. Whether income 
includes just royalties or also includes services income, income from 
embedded product sales, or capital gains from the sale of IP (whether or 
not the jurisdiction normally recognizes capital gains) is a matter to 
consider. Income definitions not only affect the IP regime but also affect 
transfer pricing (in the case of subsidiaries with offshore parents). 
Capturing too little of the income leaves potential revenues on the table, 
while capturing too much can brand the jurisdiction as a tax haven (lower 
taxes on income that is not matched to qualifying expenses). 
In addition, outsourcing also creates issues for the development of a 
box scheme. Are the expenses and income of unrelated entities who 
perform work for a taxpayer to be treated the same as related parties? In a 
copyright context, providing for outsourced labor (a production studio, for 
example) may well play into the strategy of attracting new talent and 
investment to the jurisdiction, but does it raise the question of 
substantiality because there would be less direct involvement in the 
process by “new” participants? 
Does the regime require that taxpayers maintain all relevant 
information for determining the allocation of income to the innovation box 
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regime? Is there a provision for information sharing with other tax 
authorities? 
CONCLUSION 
Countries have been attempting to use a patent box regime as a tax 
incentive to bring large, IP producing companies within their borders and 
add to their tax base. However, a copyright box does not demand an 
already thriving and sophisticated infrastructure, and it has the potential to 
generate as much—if not more—revenue than a patent box, making the 
copyright box highly attractive to developing countries. 
A copyright box may be quicker to implement, easier to administer, 
and requires a smaller budget. Those interested in creating, producing, and 
distributing copyrights may be more mobile, as projects can be more 
discrete. In short, a copyright box may be an easier step to attracting 
foreign investment. 
While much of the attention has been directed to patents and “high-
tech” box schemes, developing nations would be well served to consider 
copyrights and their potential effect on GDP. A copyright box has the 
potential to attract foreign investment, copyright creators and their related 
industries, and increased growth without the level of infrastructure needed 
for other types of IP. 
